The Constitutional Conflict Between the State and the Regions as an Indicator of the Need for Constitutional Reform

Abstract

This contribution investigates the current trajectory of Italian regionalism, disentangling it from the narrower debate on asymmetric regionalism under Article 116(3) of the Constitution. It argues that the reduction of regionalism to differentiated autonomy reflects an ideological misrepresentation that obscures the structural crisis of Title V and the persistent imbalance between unity and autonomy. The analysis combines constitutional jurisprudence and quantitative data on State–Region litigation, showing both the decline of principal proceedings before the Constitutional Court and the rise of extra-judicial coordination mechanisms, often resulting in a problematic “bargaining of legitimacy.” The paper contends that such practices undermine constitutional rigidity and transparency, calling instead for systemic reforms: notably the establishment of a second chamber representing regional interests, the strengthening and possible constitutionalization of the State–Regions Conference, and the elevation of loyal cooperation to a foundational constitutional principle. Only through such reforms can the Italian system reconcile the dialectic of unity and differentiation in a manner consistent with constitutional legality and the protection of fundamental rights.