Reasonable duration of the administrative trial: various perspectives

Abstract

This paper offers a critical analysis of the principle of the reasonable duration of administrative trials, tracing its normative trajectory from Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to its constitutional entrenchment in Article 111(2) of the Italian Constitution. After briefly addressing its dual conceptual dimensions—subjective (as an individual right) and objective (as a benchmark of efficiency and sound judicial administration)—the paper focuses on special procedural regimes, particularly in public procurement and infrastructure projects funded under the National Recovery and Resilience Plan (PNRR). In such contexts, the principle is often operationalised through the compression of procedural timeframes, justified by imperatives of economic and administrative stability, yet not always compatible with the effective exercise of the right of defence. The core of the analysis develops along two principal axes. The first concerns the tools available to administrative courts—most notably, simplified judgments and the so-called “most evident reason” principle—highlighting the risk that mechanisms designed to promote expedition may, when deployed indiscriminately, compromise the quality of judicial reasoning and the substantive effectiveness of legal protection. This concern is framed within a broader reflection on the potential misuse of judicial discretion in the name of procedural economy. The second axis addresses the conduct of the parties, with particular attention to the ethical and collaborative dimensions of procedural behaviour. In a legal system increasingly oriented toward the deflation of caseloads, the paper analyzes the use of formally legitimate yet substantively abusive procedural strategies—such as raising an objection on jurisdiction at the appellate stage by the very party who instituted the first instance proceedings—as practices that conflict with the principle of procedural self-responsibility and the duty of loyal cooperation in the administration of justice. The analysis also engages with the principle of clarity and conciseness in procedural submissions, construed as a functional tool to enhance procedural integrity and to counteract dilatory tactics.

The conclusion contends that the reasonable duration of proceedings cannot be elevated to an absolute metric of judicial efficiency, nor subordinated to exclusively managerial or accelerative rationales. Rather, it must be interpreted as a systemic balancing clause: a procedural standard whose normative value is contingent upon its integration within a framework of proportionality, effectiveness, and due process. Accordingly, any legislative or judicial intervention aimed at compressing procedural time must be justified by the qualitative demands of adjudication, not by speed alone.