Dialogo interreligioso, epistemologia analitica del disaccordo e alcuni modelli medievali

Abstract

When we refer to a dialogue a public context of discussion is often assumed (1) in which it is necessary and urgent to reach a compromise which can bring together between the interlocutors, and (2) which can garantee social peace. Even the interreligious dialogue is conceived the same way, because during the Modern Age it was historically and formally born as an attempt to stem the violence provoked by religious wars. This perspective, on the other hand, changes if we consider the epistemologic aspects of a dialogue that I suggest we can start analyzing from the so-called disagreement epistemology, which arose in the current analytic field. In this context, different religious beliefs can be appreciated as legitimate and so the dialogue between epistemic peers becomes fruitful beyond the cvergences of opinions. After analyzing Helen De Cruz’s position on religious disagreement, I will show how it can be strengthen through what some medieval writings have achieved. I will consider the usefulness of Augustine’s The Advantage of Believing, Al-Ghazali’s The Beginning of Guidance, Anselm’s Why God Became Man, Maimonide’s The Guide for the Perplexed and Aquinas’ About the Reasons on Faith to an Antiochenun Scholar. This analysis identify a medieval paradigm for interreligious dialogue which is still interesting in our time. In particular, it is able to overcome, on one side, the violent outcomes of a rationalism which pretends to insist blindly on a specific religious truth and, on the other side, the skeptical outcomes of a position linked to the notion of incommensurability. Carrying reasons to one own faith (1) committing in a reciprocal comprehension which admits a disagreement and (2) without expecting the adhesion of the interlocutor can be counted among the goals of a successful interreligious dialogue.