Italiano Italiano: Italiano

Abstract

This paper explores a central misunderstanding in the contemporary critique of anthropocentrism. It distinguishes between the collapse of anthropocentrism’s empirical assumptions and the need to redefine its normative dimension, with the aim of revitalizing engagement with the challenge raised by animal welfare. The first section outlines the development of the animal welfare debate, from the Brambell Report to the emergence of animal ethics. The analysis then distinguishes three dimensions of anthropocentrism – epistemological, ontological, and ethical. The third section, drawing on Hume’s arguments, shows that moral norms cannot be inferred from empirical facts, thereby reaffirming the autonomy of ethical reasoning. In conclusion, by clarifying a persistent misunderstanding in critiques of anthropocentric morality, the article identifies possible directions for debating a transition toward an ethical framework capable of addressing the claims of non-human others.